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The paper presents a public-choice analysis of the existing exchange-rate regimes in 
transition economies, with special reference to Eastern Europe. The links between 
policy making, rent seeking and exchange-rate regimes are thus examined in detail 
from a theoretical point of view, and then compared with the existing empirical evi- 
dence. Some comments about the role of the West and of international organizations 
are also put forward. 
I. Issues in the Choice of  an Exchange-Rate Regime 
The adoption of  a satisfactory exchange-rate regime has been one of  the most promi- 
nent issues that policy makers in Eastern Europe have been facing since the transition 
process began some 5 years ago. Such prominence is justified from several viewpoints. 
The exchange rate has often been identified as a "prestige" variable, with respect to 
which politicians in all countries tend to be fairly sensitive. 1 In addition, it is often an 
We are deeply grateful to Peter Botousharov, for his comments  and  very substantial contributions to various parts 
of  this paper.  We are also indebted to Jean  Pierre Centi, Anthony De Jasay, Deepak Lal, Fred McChesney, Russell 
Osgood,  Giovanni Pavanelli and  J o h n  Hppenge r  for their comments  on preliminary versions, which have also ben- 
efitted f rom presentations at Cornell  and  at George Mason Law Schools, as well as at the Centre d 'Economie  Appliqu6e 
de l'Universit6 d'Aix-Marseille. 
IThis applies both to industrialized countries and  to less developed countries (LDCs). One  may recall currency 
policies in the mid-1920s, or  to the Canadian experience dur ing  the Great  Depression; more  recently, one may refer 
to the French-Franc policy and  desiderata vis-a-vis the Deutsche Mark, especially in the 1960s and  in the 1970s; or  to the 
Italian Lira and  the Bridsh Pound  in 1992 (in both cases substantial amounts  of  foreign currency reserves before giving 
in to devaluation); or  to most LDCs (including the Communist  bloc before transition), where the domestic currency 
was pegged to some "pres t ige"  currency, and  then made irrelevant on international financial markets by denying 
convertibility (so as to resist pressure to devalue). 
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attractive tool for economic policy, for instance, the imbalances caused by an expan- 
sionary monetary policy may be corrected by devaluation. 
To simplify matters, one may say that the choice of the appropriate exchange-rate 
regime boils down to the role of convertibility, that is, the freedom to buy currencies, 
assets, and commodities with given amounts of the domestic currency; of course, the 
price at which such transactions take place (the nominal exchange rate) may be fixed 
by the central bank, or may be flexible, according to supply and demand conditions. 
Clearly, free-market principles suggest the adoption of a convertible, flexible ex- 
change-rate currency. Yet, a more or less cautious neoclassical macro approach usually 
has been preferred; the choice of the appropriate exchange-rate policy and regime is no 
longer clear cut. For instance, the emphasis on macro-stabilization has led some to 
argue that convertibility becomes relevant only after stabilization has been accom- 
plished [cf. Bruno (1993)]. On the other hand, unambiguous technical recipes about 
fixed and flexible exchange rates are deemed to apply--at  best---only to long-run 
equilibrium configurations, when "all countries end up with a more or less fixed 
exchange r a t e . . .  [while] floating rates are mainly adopted in an initial phase, because 
of a lack of foreign exchange reserves."2 
Nor does Eastern Europe present a clear picture where both flexible and fixed- 
exchange rate regimes have been adopted, often in the same country (in different 
periods). As a matter of  fact, since both credibility and structural adjustment are badly 
needed in transition countries, policy prescriptions tend to be contradictory, and ex- 
change-rate theory turns out to be of little help. In addition, policy makers must also 
take into account the political feasibility of a given conduct; public opinion (whatever 
that means) may not accept "optimal proposals" and political careers may be endan- 
gered. More generally, both the nature of the feasible change and its speed also depend 
on the initial economic and institutional conditions of the country. 3 
Still, we claim that the choice of the exchange-rate regime is neither random, nor 
arbitrary. In particular, we maintain that the influence of orthodox exchange-rate eco- 
nomics in most transition economies is modest; rent-seeking phenomena are more 
likely to prevail, while technicalities provide shelter vis-d-vis potential criticism, or par- 
tially disguise welfare redistribution effects. In turn, as recently mentioned in Krueger 
(1993, ch. 5), the economics of the exchange rate become useful to explain and un- 
derstand how coalitions are formed, what they want, and possibly what they are likely to 
achieve. 
A public-choice approach thus is made use of to investigate (a) the role of institutions 
and rent-seeking activities as regards the choice of the exchange-rate policy, (b) the 
effects of the most relevant exchange-rate policies on the typical bargaining situation in 
an Eastern European country, and (c) the possible role of international organizations 
and of the "West" at large to solve---or ease-- the public-choice deadlocks on the way 
to successful transition. 
Let us start with convertibility. 4 As is known, a fully convertible exchange rate leads 
to efficient relative prices in the tradable sector. But it also leads to imbalances in 
2Cf. again Bruno (1993, p.8). 
3A partial exception to the traditional neglect of these issues is found in GuitiSJn (1994), where die choice among 
different exchange-rate regimes is analyzed by considering the structural features of the country and the political goals 
of the authorities (but not their self-interest/rent-seeking motivations). 
4See Greene and Isard (1991) for an excellent survey of currency convertibility in transition economies. 
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production, due to excess demand in those industries that produced goods the relative 
price of which was too low before transition took off, and to excess supply in the 
opposite case. Social unrest and resistance to transition could easily come to the surface. 
On the other hand, the lack of convertibility means that relative prices in the tradable 
sector are the result of the mix between some kind of central planning (foreign-trade 
controls, in particular, like tariffs, quotas, and licenses) and the interaction between 
domestic demand and domestic supply under autarky--we shall define this situation as 
one of "quasi autarky." When a noconvertibility solution is chosen, two possible out- 
comes can materialize. If the relative-price structure (in tradables) under quasi autarky 
is somewhere between what it was before transition and what is should be in a free- 
market, open economy, then slow transition is under way; and the lack of convertibility 
allows producers to adjust to the new prices without suffering major shocks. But tran- 
sition can hardly take place if the prices implicit in centrally planned output are closer 
to the free-trade price structure than to the quasi-autarkic one. 
The above applies to the relative prices of tradable commodities with respect to other 
tradable commodities; in fact, this is what convertibility is about. Another kind of story 
applies to the real exchange rate, which is the price of the typical tradable commodity 
relative to that of the typical nontradable commodity. If it is too weak (high), then 
tradables will be in excess supply and nontradables in excess demand, whereas the 
opposite applies to an overvalued real exchange rate. 
Of  course, under full convertibility, a weak real exchange rate generates a foreign- 
trade surplus and inflationary pressuresS; whereas a strong real exchange rate generates 
a trade deficit plus deflationary pressure and /o r  unemployment.  But if the domestic 
currency is not convertible, then an unbalanced real exchange rate generates inflation 
plus unemployment; the weakness or strength of the exchange rate only determines 
where unemployment  is located and where inflationary pressures come from. 
As regards the nominal exchange rate, a "fixed" exchange-rate rule is a commitment  
to carry out a given monetary policy. In particular, the central authority is ready to sell 
or to buy units of the domestic currency at a given price, which may be constant, or 
variable in time according to a known rule (the rule-based crawling-peg system, as 
opposed to the discretionary peg). The obvious benefit associated to this regime is 
credibility for the policy maker, which is forced to behave "properly" by the limited 
amounts of foreign reserves available to shield imbalances. 
The major flaw with fixed exchange rates is that credibility usually comes before- -not  
after--policy making has been carried out. As De Grauwe (1992, p. 53) has pointed out, 
merely fixing the exchange rate does not solve the problem, because the fixed exchange 
rate rule is no more credible than a fixed inflation rate rule. A weak government is likely 
to take its commitments back, if necessary, rather than carrying out strong policies; the 
agents know it and don ' t  take the commitment  seriously from the very beginning. In 
other words, a fLxed exchange-rate regime can make stabilization easier for a trustwor- 
thy government, and thus enhance its credibility, also vis-d-vis foreign investors and 
organizations, but it can make it harder for "wet" policy makers, for producers and 
consumers behave inefficiently during the period in which the exchange rate is fixed 
5Of course, inflation is a monetary phenomenon  and, ff the demand  for money is roughly constant, it cannot  take 
place unless the money supply increases. Yet, it is assumed that  once inflationary pressures come to the surface in some 
industries, deflationary pressures in other  industries are accommodated  by increasing the money supply (say, to f n a n c e  
the budge t  deficit). This is surely a strong hypothesis f rom the theoretical point  of  view; but  it is certainly plausible in 
the light of the recent  and  not-so-recent experience, both in Eastern Europe and  in other  parts of the world. 
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and unsustainable. As Calvo and VSgh (1994) point out, money-based strategies are 
better than exchange-rate stabilization if credibility is low. In fact, the availability of  
foreign reserves in an economy where policy is inconsistent with a stable nominal 
exchange rate provokes speculative attacks. Gains by the speculator are equivalent to 
the reserve losses by the "victim"; the higher the potential losses for the latter, the 
higher the potent ial--and indeed, likely--gain for the speculator. 
Understandably, Eastern European policy makers have not all made the same deci- 
sions, although a balanced-trade requirement and old-style Council for Mutual Eco- 
nomic Assistance (CMEA) principles have frequently come to the surface: "After the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union the new independent republics imposed taxes and 
quantitative restrictions on their exports and negotiated bilateral trade agreements. 
The restricting principles of these agreements was that exports should balance imports. 
[ . . . ]  The principle of balance was then exercised by cutting exports if the deliveries of  
the partner fell behind his promises" [Bofinger et al. (1993) pp. 10, 11]. In particular, 
the degree of convertibility is highly variable across countries, and so is the attitude 
towards the real and the nominal exchange rates. 
Rent seekers' behavior in transition may be a suitable criterion to understand how 
choices have been made. For if transition is successful, rent seekers have to decide how 
to take advantage of the process, and / o r  how to hold on to old rents, if the transition 
process is run by the old nomenclature. On the other hand, if transition is in jeopardy, 
the problem is what to do to avoid social and political reform and thus liquidation of 
existing coalitions, as predicted in Olson (1989). 
II. Politicians, Rent Seeking, and the Exchange Rate 
Politicians are assumed to pursue two objectives: stay in office as long as possible and 
maximize their income by taking part in the bargaining game with rent seekers. As a 
consequence, politicians tend to sell pieces of  law-making in exchange for money, 
power, and prestige. Unless prestige is at stake, the exchange-rate policy is not usually 
a prominent  item on the agenda of political parties or Parliament, for such policy tends 
to be determined by the government and the central bank. Nevertheless, both are 
influenced by political pressure, either because they also engage in the bargaining 
game, or because appointments are of  a political nature. The only case when this 
constraint could be at least partially avoided is where the exchange-rate regime is 
defined by the constitution. This is certainly the case when the (fixed) exchange rate is 
run by currency board supervision, a possibility that is seldom taken advantage of, since 
it would virtually cancel the role of domestic monetary policy and make all changes in 
the parity much more difficult. 6 
To stay in office a politician has to fulfill expectations and, at the same time, allow the 
speed and size of  wealth transfers to increase only if the rate of  growth of the economy 
is satisfactory, so that nobody's welfare is likely to fall. In other words, transfers are 
feasible only if perceived as a means to improve welfare significantly in the short-  
medium run, and if they do not harm anybody's present welfare too seriously. Devia- 
tions from this "golden rule" are of course acceptable for a politician, but only if they 
6Schmieding (1993) provides sound " o r t h o d o x "  suggestions about  how a fixed exchange rate system could be run 
by a currency board  in transition economies, while Bennettt  (1993) describes the working of the Estonian currency 
board. 
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entail adequate compensation from rent seekers (to balance the danger of being out of 
office). 
Convertibility 
As a consequence, when it comes to the preferred exchange-rate policy, politicians 
would 
• favor a convertible currency if the pretransition specialization pattern within the 
tradable sector is already close to the ideal configuration. In this case wealth transfers 
and adjustment costs would be limited, and the economy overall would take full 
advantage of the international division of labor. In this context convertibility may thus 
be limited only if lip service must be paid to the bureaucrats, to whom power could 
be provided by allowing some foreign-trade control, and therefore opportunities for 
rent-seeking bargaining. 
On the other hand, if the relative size of the tradable-good industries is far away 
from what the comparative advantage pattern suggests, and adjustment costs are too 
large relative to the increase in welfare generated by the exploitation of comparative 
advantage, then incomplete convertibility allows politicians to protect the economy 
from international prices, introduce structural adjustment gradually, and thus avoid 
political turmoil. 
• stick to a nonconvertible currency if the political situation is unstable and hopes to 
stay in office are virtually nil. For in this case politicians want to maximize their 
short-term, rent-seeking revenue, which is presumably greater, the greater the 
amount of central planning (and foreign-trade state monopoly) and of protected 
monopoly power in each industry. In a no-convertibility state, politicians would be 
able to extract compensation from the bureaucrats (which would manage the foreign- 
trade monopoly regime) and incumbent producers would be likely to compensate 
the politicians more than the eventual beneficiaries from a convertibility regime. 
Convertibility reduces monopoly power within the country; the amount  of di- 
rectly unproductive profit-seeking activities (DUP) that agents operating in a com- 
petitive environment can afford is of course less than that carried out by monopolists. 
This can actually turn out to be a self-reinforcing mechanism, whereby a policy 
chosen because of a limited time horizon may in fact apply to long periods. The 
soft-budget constraint associated with the rent-seeking policies described above con- 
tributes to killing financial markets and thus creates the one condition for such soft 
constraint to be acceptable to a vast majority of  economic agents. Indeed, a hard 
budget constraint with poor financial markets creates a lot of "losers," but does not 
make sure there will be winners, because in this environment the resources released 
by the inefficient firms (which have gone broke) are not employed by the efficient 
agents within an acceptable time span. 
It is then hardly surprising that--ceter/s par/bus---the desirability of  a hard budget 
constraint decreases as its enforcement is delayed, and that bankruptcy laws tend not 
to be enforced in slow-transition Eastern European countries. 
The size of  the country may also play a role. A large market may be appealing to 
foreign sellers, who can make a profit only if the currency of the country where their 
goods are sold is convertible: politicians can thus sell convertibility to foreign sellers of 
commodities. In turn, these will engage in the bargaining game only if some degree of 
monopolistic power in the new market is guaranteed; otherwise there would be no rent 
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to seek and compensate politicians for. On the other hand, the introduction of con- 
vertibility is rather hard to repeal, whereas an inconvertible currency can easily be made 
convertible, if desired. Therefore, ceteris parib~, politicians with a short-term horizon 
will prefer to strike a one-shot bargain (as the introduction of convertibility surely is, 
even if at the expense of their successors), rather than sell the stream of rents associated 
with quasi-autarkic solutions. 
The Real Exchange Rate 
Regarding the strength of the real exchange rate, two questions are in order: is a 
balanced real exchange rate a desirable target and, if not, what kind of imbalance is to 
be aimed at? 
As pointed out in the introductory section, under a convertibility regime, imbalances 
mean inflation or unemployment,  according to the sign of the deviation. But they also 
create pressures that may offset imbalances generated by other sources; this is surely the 
case during transition, when unemployment is likely to rise because of adjustment. 
Therefore, with an eye to elections, a politician may prefer a rather weak real exchange 
rate, so as to keep labor demand high; on the other hand, if the focus stays on the 
rent-seeking bargaining game, policy makers may be willing to accept a relatively strong 
real exchange rate for two reasons. Protectionist pressures in support of the tradable 
sector will rise and form the object of rent seeking by agents active in those industries; 
tariffs and subsidies may also be easy to accept by the losers (consumers), in view of the 
psychological pressure generated by the trade deficit. In addition, by creating excess 
demand in the nontradable sector, politicians will be supported by those operating in 
that part of the economy. 
In short, a convertible currency and a strong real exchange rate create a lot of room 
for rent seeking. A weak real exchange rate may speed up transition, and keep unem- 
ployment low, but it provokes inflation, with a possibly undesirable change in wealth 
distribution, social unrest, and an adverse effect on investment (as a consequence of 
social unrest and inflation). 
Under  no convertibility policy makers have nothing to fear from the foreign sector, 
since the economy is isolated from interaction with the rest of  the world and imbal- 
ances can be created or at least partially corrected with relative ease. Of  course, fiddling 
with the real exchange rate under  no convertibility requires some kind of old-style 
central planning, which may make the bureaucrat happy, but can easily anger consum- 
ers. 
The Nominal Exchange Rate 
Under no convertibility, the exchange rate is surely fixed (and meaningless), for there 
is nothing to make it vary. 
Under convertibility, the chosen regime conveys two kinds of information. A fixed 
nominal exchange rate in a transition economy implies restricted capital mobility to 
restrain speculative attacks. In addition, it suggests that the government is ready to 
compensate possible imbalances by protectionist intervention on trade flows. Instead, 
free floating means that the exchange rate is accepted to be the effect of the chosen set 
of policies, rather than the justification for state intervention. As such, the message is 
that no exchange-rate policy will be carried out. 
The former approach is obviously much more attractive in a rent-seeking perspective, 
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for it stimulates coalitions to act and secure the benefits of intervention. Indeed, it is 
often in the interest of  the politicians themselves to stick to a nominal fLxed exchange 
rate, and yet fail to carry out the so-called stabilization policies that would keep the 
exchange rate in equilibrium at the chosen level. Such failure would justify discrimi- 
natory state intervention to the benefit (among others) of policy makers---i.e., politi- 
cians and bureaucrats. In this context compliance with the conditional-aid require- 
ments put forward by international agents would be purely accidental; actually, an 
international commitment  to a fixed exchange rate easily translates into an interna- 
tional license to local politicians to interfere with domestic prices. 
In addition, even if a convertible, fixed-exchange-rate regime is successful (i.e., no 
substantial imbalances occur), the benefits of greater prestige may compensate the loss 
in short-term rent seeking. For instance, in (small) countries where social control is 
highermsee the Baltic states---short-term rent seeking attempts are likely to be pointless, 
and politicians are inclined to devote their efforts to longer-run goals, especially if the 
initial state of  the economy is already satisfactory. This is discernible in the case of 
Estonia, where the foreign side of  the economy at the beginning of the 1990s was in 
relatively good shape (see the speed of trade rerouting, from East to West, not to 
mention the balanced budget) and where, contrary to Latvia and Lithuania, the au- 
thorities could maintain a fixed exchange rate enforced by a currency board (Lithuania 
enacted a currency-board arrangement effective as of April 1994). 
Would then politicians always try to implement a fixed-exchange-rate system? The 
answer provided by the discussion outlined above is therefore "yes," unless imbalances 
are too large to be compensated by "reasonable" price intervention, or unless the 
indexat ion/anchor rule is such that the local currency is replaced by another currency 
(doUarization) and the area for rent-seeking bargaining disappears. 
Preliminary Conclusions 
In short, convertibility is really the crucial issue. For choice on this point reveals how 
much central planning the politician wants to keep or introduce, and thus determines 
the rules according to which the rent-seeking game will be played. In this light, the 
possible real and nominal exchange-rate strategies are little more than the instruments 
with which the game is played. 
By and large, the above analysis suggests that the most likely policy advocated by a 
politician during "smooth"  transition is bound to be favorable to a fixed-exchange-rate 
regime and to some convertibility. 
As regards the real exchange rate, if the time horizon is short, preference goes to a 
"strong" policy, so as to create the greatest demand for immediate rent seeking by the 
counterparts and thus profitable bargaining; the possibility of  generating increasingly 
dangerous distortions and of jeopardizing transition itself plays a minor role, because of 
calculated political shortsightedness. Practically, this may be accomplished by fixing the 
nominal exchange rate at a reasonable level without having stabilized prices, so that in 
a matter of weeks or months the real exchange rate ends up by appreciating signifi- 
cantly° 
On the other hand, a politician who wants to stay in office for longer will be more 
interested in keeping unemployment low by means of a weak real exchange rate and 
fast transition. The fight against inflation may be sloppy, but if the rise in prices is not 
too sharp, its consequences may be acceptable in a rent-seeking perspective; politicians 
would be asked to act to sustain investment and protect the population against wealth 
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redistribution. This implies the choice of  a relatively high (fixed) nominal exchange 
rate, so as to guarantee an undervalued currency in real terms for a long enough period 
to make transition credible, irreversible, and suitable to enforce a more rigorous mon- 
etary policy. 
A nonmyopic politician going through a " troubled" transition, however, can only go 
for a flexible exchange-rate regime, which usually implies a variable but appreciating 
real exchange rate, especially in transition economies 7. Otherwise the disequilibrium 
would soon become unbearable. 
III. O t h e r  Actors  o n  the  Stage 
The counterparts for the politicians are three: bureaucrats, producers, and consumers. 
Would they object to the line of action described in the Preliminary conclusions part of 
Section II? 
As has been mentioned, the politicians' aim is either to provoke repeated rent- 
seeking bargaining games without damaging transition too much (otherwise the game 
cannot be repeated by the same rent seekers), or to execute a hit-and-run performance, 
with little regard to what happens to the transition process. 
The bureaucrats'  target is even simpler. They want to operate within an environment 
that is stable enough not to run the risk of being swept away by revolutionary processes, 
but is troubled enough to provide them with adequate discretionary power, possibly 
enhanced by some degree of central planning or vigorous state intervention. In this 
light, bureaucrats may perceive a hit-and-run attitude by politicians as possibly trouble- 
some, because it leads to a rapidly deteriorating situation and possible destruction of 
existing coalitions. 
A stable legislature--or, rather, politicians who want to stay in office for long--is thus 
a much more attractive picture for the bureaucrat, especially if the transition process is 
paved with some difficulties. The bureaucrat will therefore be inclined to encourage 
exchange-rate flexibility and gradualism, s the latter involving some kind of government 
intervention. Whereas if transition is fast and smooth, bureaucrats will try to restrict 
convertibility and introduce a fixed-exchange-rate corset, so as to trigger the rent- 
seeking bargaining process, should any imbalance come to the surface. 
Private producers'  attitude is hard to assess, for there is a sharp difference between 
"old"  producers and "new" producers; the former being those already active in the 
centrally planned economy, the latter being those who are ready (or think they are 
ready) to take advantage of the opportunities offered by a transformed economy. 
By and large, old producers only are able to form coalitions, since new producers are 
simply not there. As a consequence, producers '  interest groups will try to have a pro- 
7The secular and  cyclical reasons for that have already been explored in detail long ago. See, for instance, Balassa 
(1964), Samuelson (1964), and  Stockman (1980). 
Other  effects also characterized stabilization attempts, for instance, in Latin America, where a free-floating currency 
plus capital mobility led to a rapidly appreciat ing real exchange rate, and  thus to trouble for the domestic tradable 
industries. 
SA large body of  literature points to the fact that transition is not  made easier by gradualism, but  by shock therapies; 
the reason being that gradualism usually implies low credibility for  the policy makers and  high uncertainty for  anybody 
who wants to start a new business. Yet, shock therapy seems to be feasible only if carried out  soon after transition has 
been announced;  whereas gradualism becomes almost inevitable if expectations about  the benefits of  transition are 
allowed to drop,  so that  shock therapy reductions in welfare may be less easily tolerated. 
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tected economy; either by means of limited convertibility, or by means of convertible 
currency coupled with an appreciating real exchange rate, so as to be in a favorable 
position to ask for protection. The nominal exchange rate regime in this case is, of 
course, irrelevant in the long run; old producers want to see distortions, and they also 
want everybody to see them, so that the need of state intervention and protection 
cannot be questioned. In the short run the issue is however more delicate, although 
preference for the fixed regime is more likely to prevail. For at the beginning, a fixed 
regime would make the imbalance more rapidly unsustainable, and thus ignite the 
rent-seeking game earlier; but could also induce the government to reduce the imbal- 
ances (and the origins of distortions), and thus resist pressure towards additional in- 
tervention. On the other hand, a floating regime would delay the need for subsidies and 
indeed make entry by new producers easy, but avoid the danger of extreme changes. 
Finally, there is the workers' point of view. In general, transition economy consumers 9 
don ' t  care to much about the exchange-rate regime. Rather, they are concerned about 
the need to acquire Smithian specialization 1° and skills in a reasonably secure environ- 
ment. As a consequence, they expect the government to provide some form of guar- 
antee to protect them against possible unemployment, which may well accompany 
demand or supply shocks in a Smith-like specialization model. H 
In a country where Smithian specialization has already been achieved the need for 
social protection is less acute, since there is no need to persuade individuals to cross the 
bridge from Ricardo to Smith; hence fear of being exposed to international competi- 
tion, or of being flooded by foreign immigrants, is less intense. The exchange-rate 
regime remains a secondary subject, and is not perceived as a key element in the 
transition process. But in countries that suffer from economic and cultural backward- 
ness (as regards the basic concepts of sound economic theory) a Smithqike approach to 
the division of labor is assumed to provide, at best, potential long-term gains and 
probable short-term problems. It is not surprising that in this framework a nationalistic 
approach to economic transition is welcome. Quasi antarky (as defined previously) and 
a fixed exchange rate become attractive; while failure to comply with these require- 
ments requires compensation--an expanded welfare state or, more generally, a perva- 
sive public presence in the economy. 
IV. Some Facts 
Convertibility 
Since the beginning of transition, convertibility has been considered a very binding 
constraint. In particular, it was clearly perceived that transition, to be credible--both 
9Consumers and  workers are assumed to be the same. 
l°Specializafion can follow two kinds of  patterns. According to the Smithian approach,  workers invest in learning 
so as to be able to increase their productivity by applying their knowledge and learning abilities to a restricted domain  
of  activities. Specialization is necessary to make learning requirements manageable,  whereas deskilling is to be avoided. 
On  the other  hand,  the Ricardo-Babbage pattern assumes that  learning is relatively un impor tan t  and  that specialization 
should be acquired through deskiUing and  task fragmentation.  
In the former  case, which is more suitable if new technologies are utilized extensively in the economy, workers are 
imperfect substitutes for each other; in the latter, which is probably more  typical of the late 19th century and the first 
part  of  this century, they are almost perfect substitutes. 
11A frequent  political and  social answer to such expectations has been nationalism, which has its economic coun- 
terparts in the welfare state and  trade protectionism. Cf. Pagano (1993) for a more  detailed analysis. 
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from an economic and a political viewpoint--had to take place within the framework of 
a convertible currency. 
On the other hand, the institutionalization of convertibility was believed to introduce 
a new, higher degree of economic freedom, which could offer agents a much bigger 
opportunity to expand production and consumption. Reference was made to the cre- 
ation of a better environment due to the increased pressure from foreign competition 
and to the hoped for inflow of foreign direct investment. Of  course, this was in sharp 
contrast with the previous currency regime; despite the often-boasted peg to some 
"prestige" currencies, in fact the socialist currencies were not convertible at all and had 
to follow the "annual foreign exchange plan." 
On the other hand, at the dawn of transition, convertibility became a political issue 
per se, in that authorities were convinced that their domestic and international credibil- 
ity as reformers would be enhanced by a strong commitment to convertibility. 
As a consequence, at the outset of the reforms, the new authorities abandoned the 
annual foreign exchange plans, thereby easing foreign trade restrictions, unified the 
multitude of exchange rates, made some attempts to create foreign exchange markets, 
introduced internal convertibility, which is the right given to residents to convert their 
domestic currency balances into foreign exchange. All that led to limited current- 
account convertibility. 
This process took place in two different scenarios. It occurred in the form of a "big 
bang" in Poland (beginning of 1990), in Bulgaria and in Czechoslovakia (beginning of 
1991), and in the Baltic countries (1992). These countries removed virtually all restric- 
tions on foreign exchange for current-account transactions and they liberalized domes- 
tic prices and trade activities. But in other countries, like Hungary, Romania, Russia, 
and Ukraine, these moves were protracted in time. Today, current-account convertibil- 
ity is almost achieved in most countries in transition. 12 However, since trade restrictions 
are still imposed and effective in many countries, commodity convertibility (as defined 
in Section I), is still highly variable in Eastern Europe. 
As regards capital-account transactions, they continue to be strictly regulated in al- 
most all countries in transition, with three exceptions. Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia 
have already accepted the obligations of  Article VIII of the International Monetary 
Fund's (IMF's) Articles of  Agreement and do not apply any restrictions on inward and 
outward capital transfers. The alleged reason for keeping these restrictions in most 
Eastern European countries is to eliminate capital outflows, especially in those cases 
12Of course, the removal of  the restrictions is certainly not  complete, but  the few remaining obstacles to the genuine 
current  account  convertibility could be easily removed. In particular, the elimination of  external payment  arrears has 
recently been achieved in Bulgaria and  Poland. While the remaining exchange rate restrictions are almost exclusively 
limited to services-related transactions and  to the maintenance of  balances (often unoperat ional)  under  the bilateral 
payment  agreements,  mainly with former  COMECON countries. 
Once  these restrictions are removed, the IMF requirements unde r  Article VIII (sections 2, 3, and  4) of  the Articles 
of  Agreement  would be satisfied: a member  may not, without the approval of  the IMF, impose restrictions on making 
payments and  transfers for current  international transactions. 
Transitional provisions are nevertheless allowed for unde r  Article XlV, which let countries maintain those restric- 
tions on current-account  transactions that were in effect when such countries jo ined  the Fund. However, the IMF 
(1995, pp. 34--35) acknowledges that "because of  strictures against reimposing or  introducing new restrictions, mem- 
ber countries have been reluctant to give up  their transitional status, even when they have removed all the restrictions 
sanctioned unde r  Article XIV. Since the IMF's inception, members  have accepted the obligations of  Article VIII at the 
rate of  less than two a year. Only about  one third of  developing countries have assumed article VIII status, and  one sixth 
of  these countries have reimposed exchange restrictions." 
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where a fixed exchange rate is believed to be desirable, but subject to attack) ~ Yet, while 
outward capital movements remain tightly controlled, most countries now guarantee 
free repatriation of the investors' profits as well as of the invested capital, with no 
limitation of timing and amount. 
Real Exchange Rates 
Although the achievement of a more or less convertible currency has been an important 
part of exchange-rate policy in transition economies, the microeconomic behavior of 
real exchange rates is not an issue per se, but rather is the result of the choices deriving 
from the need to keep the current account balanced in the presence of domestic 
inflationary pressures. In other words, the microeconimic view of the real exchange rate 
was overwhelmed by the size of the macroeconomic imbalances as well as by the existing 
rigidities. 
In particular, since the equilibrium exchange rate is hard to define, especially at the 
beginning of transition, and since correcting a surplus is usually an easier job than 
cutting a deficit, it is hardly surprising that a weak--although gradually appreciadng-- 
real exchange rate prevailed, and was made possible, by the initial sharp devaluation in 
all the Eastern European currencies. The inflationary effects of such weakness were not 
considered a major question at the time, for prices were expected to rise anyway, to ease 
adjustment. 14 At the same time, however, given the far too large size of the nontradable 
sector in communist countries, weak exchange rates would imply a very significant shift 
of resources away from the nontradable industries toward tradable industries. In most 
large-country situations, the adjustment costs involved were deemed to be large enough 
to provoke possible political pressure (by producers in the nontradable sectors) and 
turmoil. As a consequence, the effects of weak exchange rates were partially offset by 
subsidies and by letting the state continue to play a significant role in the economy. Of 
course, it is hardly worth mentioning that, when this kind of intervention is particularly 
strong (say, in Bulgaria), the real exchange rate ceases to be a meaningful relative price 
and no longer has an influence on the allocation and consumption of resources. 
Nominal Exchange Rates 
In the process of transformation, Eastern European countries made different exchange- 
rate choices. Despite their common "socialist" background, according to the standard 
approach such discrepancies were caused by a legacy of dissimilar disequilibria. For 
instance, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the Baltic states had no large initial macroeco- 
nomic imbalances, unlike Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, Russia, and Ukraine) s How- 
ever, they all felt the need to single out an anchor to carry out stabilization. Some 
countries chose the exchange rate (which was therefore fixed); others chose the money 
supply (and let the exchange rate float). 
lSSee, for instance, Borensztein and Masson (1993) for a traditional approach to this issue. 
14Relative-price adjustment is thought to be politically easier if all prices move upwards, although at a different 
speeds, rather than if some move upwards and others downwards. 
15For instance, in Czechoslovakia and the Baltic states the levels of domestic and foreign debt was low, while 
Bulgaria, Hungary, and Poland had substantial amounts of foreign obligations. In addition, Bulgaria, Romania, and 
Russia experienced initial liquidity overhang, and Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Ukraine had extremely low 
foreign exchange reserves. 
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First Poland in 1990, followed by Czechoslovakia in 1991, pegged their exchange rates 
to the U.S. dollar and to a basket of currencies, respectively. At the same time, price 
liberalization programs were launched, and subsidies were reduced. Priority was given 
to price stabilization, and the exchange rate was used to curb inflationary pressures. 16 
Price stabilization was only partially successful: in the Czech Republic inflation stabilized 
at about 8-9% on annual basis, while in Poland it fell to about 30%. In fact, the Polish 
authorities had to devalue the zloty in 1991 and change the peg from the U.S. dollar to 
a basket of  currencies; in late 1991 a crawling-peg regime was introduced. 
On the other hand, flexible exchange rates applied to other East European coun- 
tries--Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, Russia, and Ukraine. Allegedly, this choice was 
justified by their vulnerable balance of payment position, heavy foreign debt, limited 
foreign exchanges reserves, monetary overhang, and lack of access to foreign financing. 
In particular, Hungary adopted an adjustable peg regime, whereas the remaining coun- 
tries went for a free-floating regime as early at 1991. It has been claimed that this 
strategy allowed them to open and liberalize their economics, which otherwise would 
not be possible. 
The three Baltic states, Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia, are a special case. In June 1992, 
Estonia (and since April 1994 Lithuania) established a fixed exchange rate 17 regime run 
by a currency board, whereby the central bank was prohibited from issuing domestic 
credit (except in the case where base money does not exceed gross foreign reserves) 
and from serving as a lender of last resort, is Latvia (and Lithuania, until April 1, 1994) 
adopted a regime of floating exchange rates. The distinctive feature of  these countries 
is their economic success, despite their late start (1992, as opposed, say, to Poland, 
where transition began two years earlier), and their different approach to the exchange- 
rate policy. 
V. The New Story Once More 
It is clear that all the Eastern European countries (except the Baltic states) have 
achieved only limited commodity convertibility, that is, current-account convertibility 
with a variety of trade restrictions. By doing so, various goals were attained. First, 
compliance with the requirements presented by the international financial institutions 
could be rightly claimed, and credibility could be acquired with reference to interna- 
tional standards. In addition, partial trade liberalization accompanying convertibility 
actually led to some real changes in the domestic economy, a more efficient relative- 
price structure, thereby showing to public opinion that transition was under way. On the 
other hand, the limitations to free trade enabled politicians to carry out transition 
gradually, and therefore smooth social unrest and possible sources of resistance; they 
also provided ample scope for protection and therefore rents. In short, limited con- 
vertibility allowed policy makers to stay in office and maximize their income by creating 
a bargaining game. 
In this light, it is not surprising that the cases corresponding to the lower degrees of 
convertibility are often situations characterized by high degrees of political instability 
161n both countries the decision to peg the exchange rate was also influenced by a commitment of the international 
community to provide financial resources to maintain the exchange rate at the chosen level. 
17Estonia pegged its currency to the Deutsche Mark, Lithuania to the U.S. dollar. 
aSActually, Hansson and Sachs (1994) have argued that the Estonian case corresponds to a quasi-currency board, 
since a "pure"  currency board backs only cash, whereas the Estonian version backs base money. 
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and  where  poli t ic ians necessarily have shor ter  t ime horizons.  O n  the o the r  hand,  con- 
vertibility is grea ter  in those countr ies  where  pre t rans i t ion  relative prices for  t radables  
were closer to free marke t  prices (the ideal conf igurat ion) .  This is conf i rmed  by the fact 
that  such economies  have been  much  more  successful in their  efforts to redi rec t  their  
t rade  flows f rom an intra-CMEA pat te rn  to a world wide pat tern.  
On  the contrary,  the achievement  of  full convertibili ty (both  on the CUlTent and  the 
capital  account)  in the Baltic states is strictly connec ted  with the d imensions  o f  those 
economies .  As has been  m e n t i o n e d  in the  nomina l  exchange  rate discussion in Section 
II, in small countr ies  social controls  are h igher  and  the scope for ren t  seeking is much  
lower. Therefore ,  poli t icians tend  to ignore  rent  extract ion and  aim at long-term po- 
litical appo in tment .  Personal  prestige and overall economic  per fo rmance  become  high- 
pr ior i ty  goals, to be pur sued  irrespective of  the initial relative-price structures. 19 
As po in t ed  out  in the real exchange  rate discussion in Section IV, the c o m m o n  
real-exchange-rate  strategy has been  character ized by fixing such a rate at an initially 
high ( that  is, weak) level, and  then let t ing it apprec ia te  as the price of  nont radables  
failed to adjust to the " m a r k e t "  level. This strategy was surely dictated by the need  to 
accommoda te  macro- imbalances  and choices as regards  convertibil i ty and  the anchor  
for prices. But it had  some rent-seeking implicat ions as well. The  initial deprec ia t ion  
crea ted  a barga in ing  game with p roducers  in the non t radab le  sectors, who looked  for 
some kind of  protect ion.  Whereas  the subsequent  apprec ia t ion  kept  the game going 
with non t radab le  producers ,  poli t icians could  thus threa ten  drastic and  motivated cuts 
in protect ion,  and  start a new game with t radable  p roducers  (who would seek protec-  
tion, in turn) .  
AS for the nomina l  exchange-rate  regime,  the t radi t ional  view is well known: 
Fixed exchange rates are likely to be more desirable, the more open the economy 
is, in the sense of being subject to external nominal shocks, and the more inte- 
grated it is with its neighbours. [Frenkel et al., (1991), p.9]. 
When domestic shocks are monetary, the conventional view is that maintaining 
a fixed exchange rate would be more effective in stabilizing output. [. . .] In con- 
trast, when the domestic shocks are real, the exchange rate should be adjusted to 
stabilize output by generating (or withdrawing) external demand. [. . .] Generally 
speaking, to the extent that the policy aims at stabilizing output in the face of 
transitory shocks, the exchange rate should be adjusted when shocks originate 
abroad or in the domestic goods market, but should be fixed when shocks originate 
in the domestic money market. [Aghevli et al., (1991), p. 6]. 
Thus, fLxed exchange  rates are assumed to be more  suitable to relatively open  econo-  
mies (so that  external  nomina l  shocks do  not  imply real  consequences  and do  no t  lead 
to uncer ta inty) .  The  opposi te  is a rgued  for relatively closed economies ,  where  domest ic  
(real) ad jus tment  is assumed to be made  easier by using the nomina l  exchange  rate as 
well, so as to cont ro l  aggregate  demand .  2° It would then  follow that, since a transit ion 
economy by defini t ion undergoes  major  real shocks, the adop t ion  of  a flexible ex- 
change-rate  regime should  have been  a mat ter  of  course. 
Yet, the transi t ion exper ience  has shown that  several among  the countr ies  involved 
t r ied at least once  to adop t  a f ixed exchange  rate (a l though some of  them failed to keep  
it so even before  the regime became opera t ional ) ,  whereas o thers  went  straight  for  a 
t°Additional examples are provided by the recent economic developments in Slovenia and Croatia. 
Z°See also Borensztein and Masson (1993) for a more problematic approach. 
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flexible regime. Furthermore, contrary to conventional wisdom, fixed exchange rates 
were sought and finally adopted by those countries with a credible enough government, 
not by those who needed credibility very badly. 
To solve this inconsistency, this paper has taken the view that many policy makers 
tried to go for some kind of fixed exchange-rate regime to create and extract rents, with 
the notable exception of the Baltic states. In some countries the overall initial situation 
was compatible with a gradual-transition outlook, so that a fLxed exchange would have 
been manageable. That is, not only there were no dollarization problems, but macro- 
economic disequilibria would not come to the surface too rapidly. In these cases, fixed 
rates were adopted and rents created. In other countries the initial disequilibria were 
just too sharp to be compensated by reasonable price intervention; flexible rates were 
the only choice available, the alternative being dollarization. In these cases, however, 
rents were created or preserved by limiting the degree of convertibility. 
The graph above presents the position of the various countries as regards the existing 
correlation between the degree of currency convertibility and the level of exchange-rate 
flexibility at the end of 1994. 2] By and large, our conclusions seem to be confirmed. 
2]The evaluation of the degree of convertibility and of the level of exchange-rate flexibility is based on the 
information contained in several recent studies in the various issues of the IMF's Annual Report, "Exchange Arrange- 
ments and Exchange Restriction," as well as on our own estimates. In particular, the degree of convertibility has been 
assumed to depend on (i) the regime for opening foreign-currency deposit accounts by both residents and nonresi- 
dents, (ii) {he degree of trade liberalization, (iii) restrictions on payments for and proceeds from invisibles, including 
limitations to travel allowances, (iv) the regime for foreign investments by residents, and (v) the existence of bilateral 
payment arrangements and payment restrictions. 
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Countries going through smooth transition and where pretransition relative prices in 
tradables were closer to free-market prices have favored fLxed exchange rates with high 
convertibility (Estonia, Lithuania, the Czech Republic, and the Slovak Republic). The 
opposite seems to be true for countries undergoing "troubled" transition, where the 
relative-price structure is gready distorted (Bulgaria, Russia, and Ukraine).22 
Within this framework, currency support commitments granted by the international 
community were surely welcome by the Eastern-European authorities, but not because 
such support would help keep the exchange rate fixed. Rather, it was welcome for 
domestic political reasons, in that a public international endorsement of their policies 
would strengthen their political status. 
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